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ABSTRACT

This Article reevaluates the importance of business
organizationalforms with regard to venture capital funds by
exploring two major Asian markets, China and India. Evidence
suggests that the limited partnershipis the leading business form
among Chinese venture capital funds. On the other hand, Indian
venture capital funds are predominantly organized as private

noncharitabletrusts. These findings challenge the orthodox view
that the limited partnership is the preferred business form for
venture capitalfunds. Instead, Indian venture capital funds have
used the trust vehicle effectively and regard it as a functional
equivalent to limited partnerships. This Article argues that the
choice of business form is not the sole determinant of a vibrant

venture capital market due to the presence of multiple functional
equivalents that can substantially satisfy the goals of investors
and fund managers. This Article therefore advocates for a more

nuanced analysis that takes into account peculiar local factors
when considering if a particular business form should be

introduced to facilitate the development of a venture capital
market.
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L INTRODUCTION

As engines of growth in the start-up sector, venture capital funds
perform a crucial intermediation role since they pool capital from
various investors, both individual and institutional, and in turn make
early stage investments into portfolio companies.1 A specific ownership
and management structure epitomizes the venture capital industry,
with venture capital funds comprised of active managers who bear

unlimited liability and passive investors who enjoy limited liability 2
Accordingly, organizational forms in any jurisdiction ought to supply
default rules that facilitate the establishment of firms with these
features in an optimal combination that not only enables venture
capital fundraising and investments but also protects the interests of
the investors. This is usually achieved by aligning the interests of the
managers and investors. While this much is incontrovertible, the

question that arises-one that strikes at the heart of this Article-is
whether any particular business form or organizational structure is

the most desirable solution to incentivize venture capitalists and meet
the needs of investors.

1.
See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineeringa Venture CapitalMarket: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003); see generally Lin Lin, Venture
CapitalExits and the Structureof Stock Markets in China, 12 AsIAN J. COMP. L. 1 (2017).
2.
See J. William Callison, Venture Capitaland CorporateGovernance:Evolving
the Limited Liability Company to Finance the EntrepreneurialBusiness, 26 J. CORP. L.
97, 101 (2000); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Limited PartnershipsRevisited, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 953, 958 (1999); Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership,37
EMORY L.J. 835, 865 (1988).
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Conventional wisdom indicates that the limited partnership has
become ubiquitous as the preferred business form for venture capital
funds.8 It allows venture capitalists to act as general partners (GPs)
and engage in the management of the fund, while investors act as
limited partners (LPs) with limited interventional capabilities in the
control of the fund.4 Management rights and liability go hand-in-hand
as GPs bear unlimited liability for the actions of the firm, while LPs
obtain the benefit of limited liability, except when they intervene in the
fund's management.5
Scholars have lauded the limited partnership as an appropriate
6
vehicle for venture capital funds, referring to it as "venerable" and as
"the single most important organizational innovation of the modern
venture capital system." 7 The limited partnership structure first
became visible in the American venture capital arena in the 1960s,8
and turned into the dominant organizational form starting in the
1970s,9 due especially to the legal and tax incentives available to it.10
Some have called for a widespread application of the United States1
style limited partnership by other countries, especially in Europe.
Further, legislatures in some jurisdictions have hastened the
introduction of the limited partnership, while in others they have
sought to modernize existing limited partnership structures to suit
evolving business needs. For instance, jurisdictions such as China,

See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships:A Study in
3.
Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002).
4.
See id. at 366.
5.
See Lin Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from China,
30 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 160, 181 (2017) [hereinafter Lin, Engineeringa Venture Capital
Market].

Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Limited PartnershipReform in
6.
the United Kingdom: A Competitive, Venture Capital Oriented Business Form, 5 EUR.
Bus. ORG. L. REv. 61, 65 (2004).
Martin Kenney & Richard Florida, Venture Capitalin Silicon Valley: Fueling
7.
New Firm Formation, in UNDERSTANDING

SILICON VALLEY: THE ANATOMY OF AN

ENTREPRENEURIAL REGION 98, 121 (2000).
See Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 365.
8.
See Josh Lerner, BOULEVARD OF BROKEN DREAMs: WHY PUBLIC EFFORTS TO
9.

BOOST

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND VENTURE CAPITAL HAVE FAILED-AND WHAT TO DO

ABOUT IT 10 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
See Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us
10.
About Venture CapitalContracting,in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCIAL GAP:
LINKING GOVERNANCE WITH REGULATORY POLICY 54,

69 (Michael

J. Whincop ed., 2001);

Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants:An Empirical Analysis of Venture
PartnershipAgreements, 39 J.L. & EcON. 463, 469 (1996) (discussing the rise of limited
partnerships as the dominant organizational form in venture capital); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and
the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865, 885 (1997)
(explaining that legal forms and contractual mechanisms support incentive alignment);
William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations
27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 489 (1990) (discussing the legal and tax benefits of limited
partnerships).
See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 65.
11,
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Singapore,

New

Zealand,

Taiwan,

Japan,

and

(VOL. 53:949
Switzerland have

introduced the limited partnership over the last decade,i 2 while others
such as the United Kingdom, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), and
Australia modified their limited partnership law to meet changing
business requirements. 1 3 This has propelled the limited partnership to
be the dominant business form globally.14
The other business vehicle for venture capital and other similar
investment funds is the trust, which has not received as much
attention from the business and legal circles, despite its suitability for
the purpose.1 5 When a trust is used as an investment vehicle,' 6 the
trustee manages assets on behalf of the investors who are the
beneficiaries of the trust. This arrangement substantially mimics the
limited partnership structure, whereby the beneficiaries are the
passive investors and the trustee (or its agents) is the active
manager. 17 While the trust originated under the Anglo-American
tradition, the concept has now been transposed to several civil law
jurisdictions as well.' 8 Yet, the trust has not received much traction as
a business form for venture capital, especially when compared with the

proliferation of limited partnerships across various jurisdictions.19
Against this background, several questions emerge. Is there a
specific business form that is optimal for funds and essential to
constructing a successful venture capital market? If so, is the limited
partnership the most optimal business form? Can other business
forms, such as the trust, act as functional alternatives to the limited

See Lin, Engineering a Venture CapitalMarket, supra note 5, at 181.
See id.; see also Lin Lin, Venture Capital in Singapore: The Way Forward, 5
J. BUs. L. 363, 377 (2019) [hereinafter Lin, Venture Capital in Singapore].
14.
See Lin, Engineeringa Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 180-81.
15.
See John Morley, The Common Law Corporation:The Power of the Trust in
Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2149 (2016) (pointing out
that trusts have received little attention from scholars); Robert H. Sitkoff; Trust as
"Uncorporation" A Research Agenda, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31 (2005) [hereinafter
Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation"] (explaining that the modern trust has been less
explored).
16.
See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A
ComparativeLegal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 434, 436-37 (1998); John
H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107
YALE L.J. 165, 170-73 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business
Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 564 (2003) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, Unraveling the Mystery].
17.
See Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 633 (2004) [hereinafter Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law].
18.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations:An
Invitation to Comparatists, 13 DUKE J. COMP. INT'L L. 321, 322-23 (2003) [hereinafter
Schwarcz, An Invitation to Comparatists].
19.
See John H. Matheson, Choice of Organizational Form for the Start-Up
Business, 1 MINN. J. BUS. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 11-15, 18 (2002) (discussing the
proliferation of limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies in the
context of start-up ventures choosing business forms); Callison, supra note 2, at 98.
However, this paper is confined to an analysis of the limited partnership and the trust.
12.

13.
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partnership and help engender a vibrant venture
Article seeks to address these questions through
of the business forms that are dominant in the
venture capital markets. An analysis of these
interesting for a number of reasons. First, these

capital market? This
a comparative study
Chinese and Indian
two jurisdictions is
are two key markets

for venture capital, not just in Asia but around the globe. 20 Second,
venture capital has thrived in both markets despite the fact that
venture capital funds in each jurisdiction adopt altogether different
business forms (viz., the limited partnership in China and the trust in

India).2 1
Recognizing the importance of limited partnerships to venture
capital fundraising, the Chinese legislature introduced the limited
partnership under the revised Partnership Enterprise Law (PEL),

which became effective on June 1, 2007.22 The adoption of the limited
partnership was part of the government's strategy to develop the
venture capital market. 23 Consistent with the benefits of limited
partnerships in the United States, the Chinese limited partnership
regime also has two types of partners: GPs, who are jointly and

severally liable for the debts and liabilities of the firm, and LPs, who

24
are only liable to the extent of their capital contributions. LPs are not
permitted to "carry out partnership affairs," while GPs have the right
25
to conduct the day-to-day management of the firm. The PEL also
provides a "safe-harbor" list of the activities in which LPs may engage
26
without being viewed as participating in the management of the firm.
This is in order to assist LPs in demarcating the legitimate scope of
27
their participation in the firm's activities. The limited partnership

has since become the most popular business vehicle among newly
raised funds in China (see Table 1).28 Before the introduction of the
limited partnership, companies and trusts were the two major forms of
venture capital fund formation in China, whose importance has since
29
drastically declined.

20.

See PREQIN INSIGHT: ALTERNATIVE ASsETS IN INDIA, PREQIN

20

(2017),

http://does.pregin.com/reports/Pregin-InsightAlternative-Assets-in-India-November2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZTV-QQUT] (archived Feb. 2, 2020) (showing that China is
a major market and India is a growing venture market); see also Lin, Venture Capital in
Singapore, supra note 13, at 365.
See Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 165, 167.
21.
See id. at 182.
22.
23.
See id.
24.
See Partnership Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China,
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June
1, 2007), ch. I, art. 2.
Id. at ch. 1, art. 2, ch. III, arts. 67-68.
25.
Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 182-83.
26.
See Partnership Enterprise Law art. 68; Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital
27.
Market, supra note 5, at 183.
See Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 175.
28.
See id. at 184 (Table 5 shows the change of dominant business forms for funds
29.
in China over the years).
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While the limited partnership has risen in popularity in China,
venture capital funds in India are predominantly organized as private
noncharitable trusts. 30 These trusts are governed by an age-old
legislation in the form of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882,31 which sets out
the default terms governing such private trusts.32 Counterintuitively,
and in the age of the major expansion of the limited partnership form,
trusts have been used effectively in the Indian context as functional
equivalents to the limited partnership. The investors, as beneficiaries
to the trust, play a similar role to LPs, and the investment manager,
as the trustee or its agent, discharges a role similar to that of the GP
in a limited partnership. The principal explanation for India's unique
approach can be attributed to the fact that there is no legislative
framework that enables the establishment of limited partnerships in

India.
While this is understandable,

the situation deserves further

explanation. Why has the legislature in India failed to jump on the
bandwagon and introduce the limited partnership form to facilitate the
growth of venture capital? Curiously, while there have been some
recommendations for the introduction of the limited partnership form,
these proposals have not received much momentum. 33 These proposals
have not received significant attention from the legislature due to the
lack of impetus from the industry and practitioners, who have simply
enjoyed tremendous comfort with the trust structure over the years. 34
In fact, there is a perceptible resistance against a change in the
business form, indicating the influence of path dependence.3 5 Unlike
in China, where the limited partnership represents a recent

&

30.
See Sai Krishna Bharathan & Ganesh Rao, Alternative Investment Funds in
India: Unlocking Sophisticated Investment, 3 NAT'L L. SCH. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017);
Abhinav Sharma & Apurva Kanvinde, Private Equity in India: Market and Regulatory
Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L., Nov. 1, 2016. WL 85042425: Ashwath Rau,
Pallabi Ghosal & Vivaik Sharma, Investment Funds 2019: India, CHAMBERS
PARTNERS.

https://practiceguides.chamberscom/practice-guides/investment-funds-

2019/india (last updated July 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BG6R-9CNK] (archived
February 2, 2020).
31.
See generally The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882).
32.
It is necessary to distinguish private trusts from public charitable trusts,
which are governed by a somewhat different legal regime. Public charitable trusts are
beyond the scope of this paper.
33.
See generally REPORT OF K.B. CHANDRASEKHAR COMMITTEE ON VENTURE
CAPITAL, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA (2000) [hereinafter CHANDRASEKHAR COMMITTEE
REPORT] (recommending limited partnerships); REPORT SUBMITTED BY ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA (2016)
[hereinafter AIPAC REPORT - I] (making recommendations regarding limited
partnerships in India).
34.
This view emerged strongly in our conversations with legal practitioners in
India involved in the venture capital fund formation space.
35.
See Callison, supra note 2, at 107; Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation",supra
note 15, at 45-46.
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36
innovation, the trust form has been tried and tested in India. The
forces of path dependence help explain the different trajectories
adopted by China and India, with China's venture capital market
rapidly embracing the limited partnership and India continuing to
shun it.
Using the examples of China and India, this Article argues that
the presence of specific business forms, while important at the outset,
is not determinative of the growth of the venture capital market if
there are functional equivalents that can substantially achieve the
goals of investors and managers. Where multiple organizational forms
are available under law, parties are likely to choose the most optimal
one.3 7 The choice of venture capital firms in China in preferring the
limited partnership structure to trusts is emblematic of this

phenomenon. However, where only one business form is available,
parties are likely to nevertheless adopt it, despite minor inefficiencies,
as long it provides the same principal benefits as the dominant (absent)
form. 38 Not only does the use of trusts in India characterize this
position, but the feebleness of the reform efforts and resistance to
change suggests that market players are willing to continue using the
form that is embedded in the legal system, even if it is inefficient
compared to proposed alternatives. In this situation, the legislative
and transactional costs of transitioning to a perceived optimal business

form, such as the limited partnership, will likely be higher than
maintaining the status quo.
At the same time, the choice of business form depends on a
number of historical and institutional factors. The trajectory in China
is evident from the fact that both the trust as well as the limited
partnership were relatively new, thereby allowing for switching
between the business forms. On the other hand, given the entrenched
nature of trusts in India, one might assume that even if limited
partnerships were to be legislatively permitted, the take-up rate is
39
In that sense, this Article challenges the
unlikely to be significant.

See Vishal Gada & Zeel Jambuwala, Documenting the Trust Framework,
2019),
23,
(Apr.
TIMES
https://economictimes indiatimes.com/familybusinessforum/insights/documenting-the[https://perma.cc/84CTY2CR]
trust-framework/articleshow/69003942.cms?from=mdr
(archived Feb. 2, 2020).
See Christopher Gulinello, Venture Capital Funds, OrganizationalLaw, and
37.
Passive Investors, 70 ALa. L. REV, 303, 316-17 (2006).
38. See Lin, Engineeringa Venture CapitalMarket, supra note 5, at 209,
This is evident from Singapore's experience where limited partnerships have
39.
failed to thrive despite legislative change over a decade ago that facilitated the
introduction of such a business form. See Lin Lin, Private Equity in Singapore, in
HANDBOOK ON FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND REGULATION IN SINGAPORE 563 tbl. 1
(Hans Tjio et al. eds., 2018). The limited partnership as a business form in Singapore
between 2009 and 2016 showed that the rate of adoption of limited partnerships has
been consistently low. For example, in 2016, only 142 limited partnerships were
registered in Singapore, as compared to 2431 newly registered LLPs, 27121 new business

36.

ECON.
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orthodoxy that uncritically seeks to crown the limited partnership as
the kingpin among business forms. It cautions against such a uniform
approach and advocates for a more nuanced analysis that takes into

account peculiar local factors in each jurisdiction.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II will analyze the evolution
of the business forms for venture capital in China and India and
examine the broad legal framework governing the industry. The three
Parts of the Article which follow thereafter seek to establish the
functional similarities between the limited partnership in China and
the trust in India. While the two business forms share a number of
features, they each suffer from certain inefficiencies, as this Article
seeks to demonstrate. In doing so, it is necessary to clarify that the
Article adopts a theoretical, functional, and comparative approach to

the analysis of business forms rather than a legalistic or doctrinal
approach.
Part III focuses on the issues pertaining to whether the business
forms in China and India confer entity status on the venture capital
fund. This is relevant from the perspective of ring-fencing the funds
and also addressing the claims that the creditors of the fund as well as
creditors of the investor may have. Part IV considers the delegated
management structure in each business form and, in particular,
whether and to what extent the investors enjoy the protection of
limited liability. Part V embarks upon an agency problem analysis and
examines the statutory and fiduciary duties of managers to act in the
interests of the investors, and the extent to which the investors can
enforce those duties. Finally, Part VI concludes with some key lessons
and the way forward.

I1. EVOLUTION OF VENTURE CAPITAL BUSINESS FORMS IN CHINA AND
INDIA

Organizational law displays certain fundamental characteristics,
which include the exercise of control over management, the
assumption of risk from the venture, and sharing of returns. 40 While
this is enough for most business forms, venture capital funds have
additional features essential to their activity that must be
accommodated. The first is the flexibility that actors within the
business form enjoy in establishing their contractual relationships,
setting up the business, and exiting from it.41 Such flexibility offers

(general partnerships and sole proprietorships) and 35228 companies. See Lin, Venture
Capital in Singapore, supra note 13, at 372.
40.
See Callison, supra note 2, at 100.
41,
See Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom of
Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's General
CorporationLaw, 33 DEL, J. CORP. L. 789, 790 (2008); Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 376.
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contractual freedom, which is of utmost importance to parties. 42
Second, the business of early stage portfolio companies is generally
sensitive and there is considerable secrecy surrounding venture capital
funds and their investors. Hence, venture capital funds flock to
business forms that require no disclosures to government agencies or

to the public.43 Third, the availability of tax pass-through is a sine qua
non for venture capital firms, whereby the earnings of the fund are
taxed in the hands of the investors as if they directly earned it, and not
44
at the fund level.
In light of these broad parameters, it would be essential to explore
the evolution of the limited partnership law in China and the trust in
India as fund vehicles for venture capital. This background will aid in
a deeper analysis of the respective business forms.

A. China: Rise of the Limited Partnership
Prior to the introduction of the limited partnership in 2007, the
major business forms used by venture capitalists in China to raise

funds were the limited liability company (LLC), the joint stock
company (JSC), the general partnership, and the trust.4 5 However,
that discouraged
these entities suffered from disadvantages
investment. LLCs and JSCs faced double taxation treatment,
substantial formation costs, and considerable financial disclosure
requirements. 4 6 General partnerships imposed unlimited liability on
all partners and a similarly harsh tax burden on partners until the

year 2000.47
The trust-type fund began to emerge in China in 2007, following
the enactment of the first Trust Law in 2001.48 In a typical trust-type

See Conaway, supra note 41, at 790; see also Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory
42.
of Trust Law, supranote 17, at 638.
See Jonathan Axelrad, Venture Capital's Need for Secrecy Collides with
43.
2,
2014),
(Apr.
TIMEs
N.Y.
Know,
to
Right
Public's
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/venture-capitals-need-for-secrecy-collideswith-publics-right-to-know! [https://perma.cc/Q2EL-PGA5] (archived Feb. 11, 2020).
See Conaway, supra note 41, at 790. At the same time, the interrelationship
44.
between husiness form and taxation is somewhat less specific. This is because the
legislature can accord the same tax treatment for various business forms through a
statutory sleight of hand, which bears no relation to the precise nature of the
organization. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 478; Langbein, supra note 16,
at 181. Taxation has also been considered an exogenous effect" to business. Schwarcz,
Unravelingthe Mystery, supra note 16, at 580.
See Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 183. There
45,
are also contractual-type funds in China but they are rarely used by venture capital
funds. See id. at 211-12.
See id.
46.
See id. at 183-84 (explaining that, "[b]efore 2000, the PRC partnership
47.
enterprise was subject to taxation both at the enterprise level and upon distribution;"
until 2000, when the partnership enterprise became tax transparent).
See generally Rules Governing Trust Companies (promulgated by the China
48,
Banking Regulatory Commission, 2008); Trust Law of the People's Republic of China
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fund, the trust company acts as the trustee of a fund and is responsible
for fundraising and investments. The capital is pooled from investors
by means of a trust plan. The trust company either employs a
professional investment company (normally a private equity firm or an
investment bank) as the investment consultant of the fund or conducts
investments on its own. It is also common for the trust company to set
up an investment committee to select portfolio companies and make

investments. Investors participate in the management of the trust plan
through beneficiary meetings and share profits according to the trust
plan. Although there is no taxation of trust profits and, instead, income
tax or enterprise tax is levied at the beneficiary level,4 9 trusts have not
been a popular business form for fundraising in China (see Table 1),

due to the complex structure, insufficient protection available to
investors,5 0 as well as the lack of a registration regime. 5 1

(promulgated by the President of the People's Republic of China, April 28, 2001). Before
the enactment of these laws, trust companies were not allowed to invest in the private

equity sector directly. Securities companies, trust companies or individuals in China can
establish "the non-limitative aggregate asset management plan," Trial Implementation
Measures for the Customer Asset Management Business of Securities Companies
(promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission, Dec. 18, 2003, effective Feb.
1, 2004), or "the trus[t] plan of assembled funds," Measures for the Administration of
Trust Companies' Trust Plans of Assembled Funds (promulgated by China Banking
Regulatory Commission, Jan. 23, 2007, effective Mar. 1, 2007), to engage in private
equity investments. Under such trust plans, securities companies or trust companies

enter into investment management contracts with individual investors. See generally
Measures for the Administration of Trust Companies' Trust Plans of Assembled Funds;
Trial Implementation Measures for the Customer Asset Management Business of
Securities Companies. The investors' assets are transferred to the securities companies
and pooled together for the purposes of investment. The securities companies or trust
companies act as trustees of these assets. See generally Measures for the Administration
of Trust Companies' Trust Plans of Assembled Funds; Trial Implementation Measures
for the Customer Asset Management Business of Securities Companies.
49.
See Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 183. See
generally DELOITTE, NEW BELGIUM-CHINA INCOME TAX TREATY APPLICABLE As OF 1

JANUARY 2014 2 (2014).
50.
Under the Guideline of the Trust Company Collective Funds Trust Scheme
Management 2009 (CBRC 2009, No.1), the investment committee decides on important
investment issues. It is typically formed primarily of investment consultants, one of
whom will also serve as the committee's chair, and it is supplemented by members from
the trustee company. The beneficiary meeting has no powers to interfere with project
selection and investment decision making. However, in practice, investment consultants
play a role similar to that of GPs in a limited partnership-type fund. The heavy
involvement of investment consultants in the investment making process creates a

problem of inadequate protection for the beneficiaries or investors. Since the investment
consultants are not the agents of the investors but are instead appointed by the trust
company, they do not owe duties nor are they otherwise accountable to them.
Furthermore, unlike the GPs, they do not bear unlimited liability for their investment
decisions.
51.
Article 27 of the Trustee Company Management Guideline 2007 (CBRC 2007
No. 2) provides that the "trustee company has the duty toward the trustor and
beneficiaries to keep all other trust matters and documentation confidential, except
when it is otherwise agreed upon." As a result, the trustee company, in ensuring that the
identities of the beneficiary investors are kept confidential, does not need to register the
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The very first Chinese Limited Partnership (Nanhai Chengzhang
2
Chuangye Touzi Hehuo Qiye)5 was set up on June 27, 2007, soon after
the enactment of the revised PEL on June 1, 2007.53 By the following
year, more than half of the newly raised venture capital funds were
54
Table 1 (below) shows that the
organized as limited partnerships.
limited partnership was the most popular business form among the
newly raised venture capital funds in recent years, reflecting an
overwhelmingly positive response from the business community
toward the limited partnership as a business vehicle.
The popularity of the limited partnership in China can be
attributed to several factors. First, the adoption of the limited
partnership increases the range of business options available for
venture capitalists. 55 As discussed above, the LLC, JSC, and trust had
their own limitations and were unable to comprehensively meet the
business needs of the venture capitalists and investors.
Second, much like the partnerships in most parts of the world, the
Chinese partnership is governed by the partnership agreement. 56
Partners are able to enter into bespoke covenants that align the
interests of the investors and the venture capitalists, particularly in

terms of compensation and fund management. 57 Moreover,

as

compared to companies, partnerships enjoy lower formality costs and
a greater degree of confidentiality in their financial information, which
is advantageous to investors who do not wish to disclose their
investment in the funds.5 8 Further, the combination of limited liability
for investors and unlimited personal liability for managers meets the
needs of the key players in a venture capital market, especially those
of the investors, who prefer to entrust their capital to experienced
venture capitalists and would not want to bear unlimited liability for
the debts of the partnership. 59

trust. From a legal viewpoint, the lack of registration means that trust assets and
properties cannot be fully ascertained. This has adverse effects on the law's ability to
safeguard the rights of transacting parties, particularly with regard to the transfer and
determination of assets. More importantly, the fact that the identity of the beneficiaries
cannot be determined becomes an obstacle when the portfolio company that the trust has
invested in wants to conduct an IPO.
The First Venture Capital Limited Partnershipwas Established, SHANGHAI
52.
SEC. NEWS (June 29, 2007).
53.
CHINA ZHENGQUAN BAO (+'IF'
Vid) [CHINA SECURITIES DAILY] (June 29,
2007), HTTP://MONEY.BUSINESS.SOHU.co/20070629/N250829110.SHTML.
54.

CHINA VENTURE CAPITAL. YEARBOOK 2009 252 (2009),

See Lin, Engineeringa Venture CapitalMarket, supra note 5, at 182 (pointing
out that China recognized the importance of additional vehicles as a result of the
importance of limited partnerships to venture capital).
See id. at 181.
56.
See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 62-63.
57.
See LAW COMMISSION & SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
58.
ACT 1907: A JOINT CONSULTATION PAPER, at 3.
59. See CHINA VENTURE CAPITAL YEARBOOK 2009, supra note 54, at 252.

55.
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Third, partnerships enjoy tax transparency at the entity level in
China.6 0 There are also a number of preferential tax policies for LPs
and GPs at the local level. 61 For example, in Tianjin, a considerably

low 20 percent individual income tax rate is applicable to GPs and LPs
who are natural persons, and a 100 percent subsidy is granted for any
tax above this 20 percent threshold. 62
As of now, the limited partnership has become the dominant
business form in China's venture capital market.6 3 A typical Chinese
fund has a fixed life and is organized as a limited partnership, wherein
a venture capital firm raises and manages capital. 6 4 A Chinese venture
capital limited partnership is governed by both the limited partnership

agreement concluded between the GP and LPs, as well as the PEL.65
The venture capital firm typically serves as the GP and carries out the
day-to-day operations of the fund's business, such as raising new funds,
selecting portfolio companies, and managing and monitoring the fund's
investments. 66 Investors serve as LPs and provide capital to the fund
(Figure 1).67 Most Chinese firms follow the internationally recognized
two-and-twenty compensation structure for GPs, wherein GPs receive
an annual management fee (2 percent of the committed capital) and
carried interest (20 percent of the annual profits of the fund). 68
Furthermore, to align the interests of the GP and LPs, most of the
Chinese firms would also require the GP to make a capital contribution

to the fund. 69

60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
fund).
65.

See
See
See
See
See

Lin, Engineeringa Venture CapitalMarket, supra note 5, at 183.

id.
id.
id.
id.

at 207-08.
at 179.
at 182.
at 203 (discussing the typical structure of a Chinese venture capital

See id. at 182, 201.
See id. at 182.
67.
See generally Lin Lin, Private Equity Limited Partnerships in China: A
Critical Evaluation of Active Limited Partners, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 185 (2013)
[hereinafter Lin, Private Equity Limited Partnerships in China] (explaining the
structureof PRC limited partnership in the context of China's private equity and venture
capital market).
68.
See Lin, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 5, at 196-97
(discussing variations in the Chinese compensation form).
69.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Xu, Fund Manager, Shanghai Private Equity
Fund (Aug. 29, 2019); Telephone Interview with Ms. Shao, Legal Counsel, Gaorong
Capital (Aug. 29, 2019).

66.
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Figure 1. A Typical Chinese Venture Capital Limited Partnership
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Table 1. Proportion of Different Types of Business Forms Used for
Newly Raised Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds in China 70

Yearr

Company

Others

2017

Lhmnited
PartnEr hip
82.3%

6.1%

2013

68.96%

24.14%

0.00%

6.90%

100%

2012

57.50%

35.00%

5.00%

2.50%

100%

2011

69.64%

28.57%

0.00%

1.79%

100%

2010
2009
2008

46.56%
25.20%
51.19%

45.80%
67.48%
39.29%

1.53%
3.25%
4.76%

6.11%
4.07%
4.76%

100%
100%
100%

Trust

11.6%

Total
100%

In all, while there were a number of business forms available for
venture capital funds, the introduction of the limited partnership
altered the scenario in China in such a way that the other forms,
including the trust, effectively faded away within a rather short span

of time.
B. India: The Stickiness of the Trust
Venture capital emerged as an investment form in India in the
1980s. 71 It received considerable impetus from the government. 72 The
industry began to flourish in the 1990s as the overall economic policy
of the Indian government at the time focused on liberalization. The
industry initially organized itself through an industry body in the form
of the Indian Venture Capital Association. 7 It was only in 1996 that
the industry began to be specifically regulated when India's securities

70.

See

generally

CHINA CONSTRUCTION

PRESS,

CHINA

VENTURE

CAPITAL

YEARBOOK 2008-2013 (Democracy and Construction Press). The sample sizes for the
years 2008 to 2013 are 84, 123, 131, 112, 40 and 29 respectively. See id. The 2017 figure
was collected from ZERo2IPo, 2017 CHINA EQUITY INVESTMENT - FUND RAISING
STRATEGIES RESEARCH REPORT, https://m.pedaily.en/news/431823 (last visited Apr. 19,
2020) [https://perma.cc/U7SE-N6PJ] (archived Feb. 2, 2020).
71.
See Manuel Gonzalo & Hugo Kantis, Venture Capital in India:A Critical View
from an Evolutionary and Systemic Perspective 2 (Oct. 2017), http://liee.ntua.gr/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/532-Venture-capital-in-India-,pdf
[https://perma.c/Q97X2WPG] (Feb. 2, 2020).
72.
See Rafiq Dossani & Martin Kenney, Creating an Environment: Developing
Venture Capital in India 8 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int'l Econ., Working Paper No.
143, 2002). Furthermore, non-resident Indians working in universities and corporations
in the United States, including in the Silicon Valley, began investing in Indian venture
capital firms. See id. at 24-25. This too propelled the Indian venture capital sector. See
id.
73.
See Bijal Ajinkya & Shefali Goradia, Venture Capitalism, 8 ASIA-PAC. TAX
BULL. 378, 379 (Dec. 2002).
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regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI),
promulgated a set of regulations governing the sector. 74 Although
registration was not mandatory under SEBI's regulations, the onerous

nature of the legal regime imposed constraints on the sector. 75 Hence,
following a consultation process, the 1996 regulations were replaced
with a more comprehensive set of regulations in the form of the SEBI
(Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 (AIF Regulations)
76
Apart from venture capital, the
which apply to several types of funds.
AIF Regulations also apply to private equity, hedge funds, and several
others. 77 Unlike the 1996 regulations, the AIF Regulations require
mandatory registration of alternative investment funds (AIFs) with

SEBI. 75
The AIF Regulations impose several conditions and restrictions on
79
the ability of AIFs to carry out their investment activities. In doing
so, the AIF Regulations trifurcate AIFs into different categories. 80
Category I AIFs invest in start-up or early-stage ventures or in areas
the government considers economically desirable. 81 Venture capital
funds fall within this category. Category II AIFs are the residual

category of funds that do not undertake leverage or borrowing. 82
Private equity, real estate, debt, and distressed asset funds populate
this category. Finally, Category III funds employ diverse or complex
83
These include hedge
trading strategies and may engage in leverage.
of AIFs is
regulation
of
SEBI's
extent
and
nature
funds. 84 The
market.
the
and
to
investors
of
risk
consistent with the extent
regulation
less
relatively
to
are
subject
I
AIFs
Category
Accordingly,
85
while Category III AIFs are heavily regulated.

74. See id. See also generally Securities and Exchange Board of India (Venture
Capital Funds) Regulations, 1996.
See Rohan Chinchwadkar & Vidhu Shekhar, Evolution of Private Equity
75.
Regulations in Emerging Markets:A Case of India, 20 J. PRIV. EQUITY 38, 40 (2016).
See id.
76.
See id. (explaining that the new regime is an umbrella regulatory framework
77.
to manage the alternative investments industry).

78. See Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds)
Regulations, 2012, ch. II sec 3(1).
The precise nature and scope of these conditions and restrictions are beyond
79.
the scope of this paper. For further details, see generally Bharathan & Rao, supra note
30; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note 30.
See Securities and Exchange Board of India (Alternative Investment Funds)
80.
Regulations, 2012, ch. II sec 3(4).
See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 7; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note
81.
30.
82. See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 7; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma supra note
30.
See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 7; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supranote
83.
30.
See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 7; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note
84.
30.
See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 7; Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note
85.
30.
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When it comes to business forms, the AIF Regulations permit
an AIF to be structured either as a trust, company, or limited liability
partnership (LLP). Of these three business forms, almost all AIFs are
structured as trusts. The numbers are staggering, showing that the
trust overshadows the other alternatives as the business form of

choice. Of a total of 598 AIFs registered with SEBI as of July 12, 2019,

582 are trusts, thirteen are LLPs, and only three are companies 86 In
other words, 97.3 percent of registered AIFs operate in the form of
trusts. Although SEBI does not list out the categories of AIFs, its
annual report for 2018 shows that there were 196 registered venture

capital funds. 87
Why is there an overwhelming slant toward the trust as a
business form? First, the trust structure provides considerable
flexibility to the parties in organizing their relationship.8 8 Parties are
free to contractually provide for the terms and conditions, including
their respective obligations. 89 While the Indian Trusts Act, 1882,
imposes duties and obligations on the parties, there is nevertheless
sufficient room for determining specific aspects of the relationship
through contract. 90 More importantly, trusts are simple to establish
and to dissolve, and there are no capital requirements, thereby
enabling investors to freely infuse capital and withdraw returns
without restrictions. Second, there are no reporting or disclosure
requirements under trust law, which allows parties to maintain
confidentiality regarding their contractual arrangements. This is

particularly useful in protecting business sensitive information.
Although the AIF Regulations require that the instrument of trust be

registered under the Registration Act, 1908, parties have effectively
sidestepped significant disclosure requirements by including only
standard terms in the instrument of trust, such as the trust deed. 9 1
The sensitive business-related information is instead incorporated in
the accompanying documents such as the contribution agreement and
the investment management agreement, which are not subject to
public filing requirements. 92 Finally, among the various business

86.
See Registered Alternative Investment Funds, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA,
https://www.sebi.gov.in/sebiweb/other/OtherAction.do?doRecognisedFpi=yes&intmId=1
6, (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) [https://perma.ec/AU9V-PMYE] (archived Jan. 30, 2020).
Since SEBI does not indicate the nature of business form of each AIF on its website, the
numbers had to be computed through a process of elimination using the name of the AIF.
Under Indian law, companies with limited liability must carry the word "Limited" in its
name and LLPs the word "LLP." Hence, from SEBI's list, the entities with the words
"Limited" and "LLP" were eliminated to arrive at the remaining number that represent
trusts.
87.
See SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA, ANNUAL REPORTr 2017-18, 85 (2018).
88.
See Hans Tjio, Lending to a Trust, 19 TR. L. INT'L 3, 4 (2005).
89.
See id.
90.
For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part V.
91.
Lawyers we interviewed confirmed this approach.
92.
See id.
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forms, the trust has received the most beneficial treatment regarding

its tax pass-through status.9 3
Given the benefits of the trust structure, an established legal and
commercial practice has developed around its formation and operation.
The principal parties to a venture capital fund in the form of a trust
are the trustee, investment manager, and investors (in the form of
beneficiaries of the trust) (Figure 2).94 In most cases, the trusteeship
duties are discharged by professional third-party trustees, who
undertake these roles for various funds. 95 The third-party trusteeship
phenomenon gives rise to a peculiar situation. Since these trustees
undertake their role for a fixed fee, they only discharge a nominal role
and the trustees' powers and duties are, for all practical purposes,
delegated to the investment manager of the venture capital fund
through an investment management agreement. 96 A contribution
agreement between the investors, the trustee, and the investment
manager will capture the commercial terms of the investment in the

venture capital fund.9 7

Although historically trusts have been favored, the tax pass-through
93.
treatment currently in vogue is agnostic to business form, as it is uniformly available to
all Category I and Category II AIFs, which include venture capital funds, regardless of
whether it is a trust, company or LLP. See Income Tax Act. § 115UB (1961) (India),
https://www.hostbooks.com/in/income-tax-act-1961/section-115ub-tax-incomeinvestment-fund-unit-holders/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) [https://perma.ce/6MQW5RKFI (archived Jan. 31, 2020); see also CHANIR\SEKHAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 33, at 21 (for the tenuous relationship between business form and taxation).
While the trust requires a settlor, her role is minimal and limited to the
94.
establishment of the trust with a nominal corpus.
For examples of the prominent professional trustees in this space in India, see
95.
Amicorp Trustees (India), AmicoRP GRP., https ://www.amicorp.com/offices/mumbaitrustees (last visited Apr. 19, 2020) [https://p(rma.cci6BP7-LBTF] (archived Jan. 31,
2020); BEACON TRUSTEESHIP, http://beacontrustee.co.in (last visited Apr. 19, 2020)
[https://perma.c/7E7W-Z2PW] (archived Jan. 11, 2020); IDBI TRUSTEESHIP SERViES
LTD., http://idbitrustee.com/ [https://perma.cc/WY9S-RKG6] (archived Jan. 31, 2020):
19, 2020)
(last visited Apr.
ITCL LTD., https://www.vistraitel.com
VISTRA
[https://perma.ce/WN5Y-SEDM] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
See Bharathan & Rao, supra note 30, at 11.
96.
97.
See id.
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Figure 2. A Typical Indian Venture Capital Trust
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Such a structure has been tried and tested in the Indian market
and has effectively become cookie cutter, as the market players and
their advisors are entirely familiar and comfortable with the
establishment and operation of such a trust arrangement. 9 8 They do
not perceive the need for a deviation from this well-worn path. While
foreign investors who are less familiar with the trust structure for
venture capital funding do occasionally raise concerns, Indian lawyers
are able to address them. The lawyers not only explain the successful
track record of the trust structure in India but also its flexibility and
adaptability in terms of replicating the principal features of a limited
partnership, namely passive ownership and active management.99
At the same time, there have been calls to increase the number of
business forms available for venture capital funds in India. In 2000,
the K.B. Chandrasekhar Committee appointed by SEBI called for the
creation of limited partnerships, LLPs, and limited liability companies
to provide greater flexibility and also make the Indian regime
consistent with globally accepted practices 1 00 Thereafter, LLPs were

Conversations with practitioners confirmed this position.
See id.
100. See CHANDRASEKHAR COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 33, at 4, 26-27. A
subsequent committee established under the chairmanship of Ashok Lahiri refers to the
existence of limited partnerships in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and
Australia but fails to make any recommendation for introducing the business form in
India. See Report of Advisory Committee on Venture Capital, SEC. & EXcH. BD. OF INDIA
(2003),
https://www.sebi.govain/reports/reports/oct-2003/report-of-advisory10
98.
99.
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introduced by way of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008.101
However, LLPs have not become popular in the venture capital
industry because the structure does not allow for a bifurcation between
passive investment and active management, as it does not bifurcate
between GPs and LPs. Moreover, LLPs are not only subject to more
detailed reporting requirements, but also face restrictions in making
investments. 102 Hence, the Alternative Investment Policy Advisory
Committee (AIPAC) established under the helm of Narayana Murthy,
a well-known tech entrepreneur, called for the removal of restrictions
on LLPs so that they could be set up as effective investment vehicles. 103
Over a two-year period ending January 2018, the AIPAC issued three
reports, totaling nearly 450 pages, dealing with several aspects of the
venture capital industry in India, but there was not even a whisper

about the need for a different business form such as the limited
partnership. On the contrary, the AIPAC was keen on relaxing
restrictions on the LLPs that were by then made available in India,
although that form is less suited to venture capital fund vehicles than
the globally prominent limited partnership. All of these indicate the
stickiness of the trust in India's venture capital industry, and there are
no indications whatsoever of a transition away from this business form.
The above comparison shows how the divergence in practice
between the Chinese and Indian venture capital markets came to be.
The Chinese response of abandoning the trust was facilitated by the
introduction of the limited partnership before the trust could take root
as the main form chosen by funds and investors. On the other hand,
the Indian funds have embraced the trust as it remained the key
investment vehicle for a long period of time. In doing so, they have
found ways around the limitations posed by the use of a trust form and
have instead developed path dependence in favor of the trust as the
default form, effectively stymying the introduction of the limited
partnership as a form. This suggests that the presence of a sufficiently
capable, although suboptimal, form is enough to facilitate the
development of a venture capital market. The following analysis
considers which factors are key to determining whether a specific form
can be regarded as sufficiently capable and, as a result, might act as a
guide for jurisdictions considering the introduction of a new corporate

form.

(archived
[https://perma.cc/GJ9T-VEVD]
committee-on-venture-capital 12778.html
Jan. 31, 2020).
101. See generally The Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, No. 6, Acts of
Parliament, 2009 (India).
102. See AIPAC REPORT-I, supra note 33, at 86.
103. See id.
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III. VENTURE CAPITAL FUND: ENTITY CHARACTERIZATION
The nature of partnerships has long been addressed on a
conceptual basis, determined by whether a partnership is viewed as an
"entity" separate from its partners, or an "aggregate" of the
partners. 104 In contrast to the United States, which considers the
partnership as a separate legal entity, English law treats the
partnership as an aggregate of its partners.1 05 As a result, English
partnerships do not have a legal personality separate from its partners.
Many commonwealth jurisdictions, including Singapore 1 06 and Hong

Kong,1 07 follow the English approach.
The aggregate approach means that the English limited
partnership cannot have perpetual succession. Nor can it hold property
or enter into contracts in its own name. 108 Whenever a partner retires
or a new partner is admitted, the limited partnership would cease to
exist and a new limited partnership would be created. Third parties
who deal with a limited partnership over time would then have
unknowingly transacted with several different partnerships.1 09 This
characterization of the limited partnership is unfortunately
inconsistent with commercial perception of the limited partnership as
a separate legal entity.
The entity approach provides a better reflection of commercial
reality and promotes consistency with legal developments in other
jurisdictions where the entity feature is becoming an increasingly
0
common feature of limited partnerships.' 1 It would also provide a
more elegant solution to the various practical problems currently faced

104. Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and
Functionalism in PartnershipLaw, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 396 (1989) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
105. See T. Prime & G. Scanlan, Limited PartnershipReform - The Entity, The
Fiduciary Duties and The Execution of Deeds, COMP. L. 262, 265 (2007). The aggregate
approach regards a partnership as an aggregation of the individual partners, whereas
the entity approach views the partnership as an entity separate from its partners. See
id. at 403.
106. See Lin, Venture Capitalin Singapore, supra note 13, at 377 ("The draftsman
adopted the recommendation of the 2002 study team to not include the separate legal
personality feature. Such a recommendation was made primarily because the study team
was concerned that overseas tax authorities might treat the Singapore limited
partnership as an opaque entity for tax purposes if it had a separate legal personality.").
107. See LEXIS PRACTICE ADVISOR, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS-OvERVIEW, Lexis
(database updated Oct. 12, 2019);
108. See Partnership Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, §2 (U.K.).
109. See LAW CoMM'N & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMM'N, PARTNERSHIP LAw: REPORT
ONA REFERENCE UNDER SECTION 3(1)(E) OF THE LAW COMMISSIONs ACT 1965 § 5.8 (2003).
While the third party might be required to pursue legal remedies for past wrongs against
different aggregations of persons, admittedly this is not a critical issue for limited
partnerships since general partners are readily identifiable and limited partners'
liability is restricted to their capital contribution.
110. See Elspeth Berry, Limited PartnershipLaw in the United States and the
United Kingdom: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks?, 2 J. BUS. L. 160, 164 (2012).
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in the use of limited partnerships, such as continuity on change of
partners, ownership and transfer of partnership property, and the
11 1
BVI has already adopted this
procedure and substance of litigation.
approach, and all BVI limited partnerships formed under the new BVI

Limited Partnership Act, 2017 (No. 24 of 2017) have the ability to elect

12
whether they are to be formed with or without legal personality. 1
In China, partnerships, including limited partnerships, are not
considered "legal persons" (fa ren). Under the PRC General Rules of
Civil Law, a legal person is an organization with capacity for civil
rights, civil conduct, enjoys civil rights, and assumes civil obligations
11 3
A legal person shall have
independently in accordance with the law.
its own name, organs, domicile, and property or funding. 114
Partnership enterprises are considered non-legal-person organizations

(fei fa ren zu zhi), which refer to the organizations without legal
personality but with the capacity to conduct civil actions in their own
names.1 15 Although Chinese partnerships do not have a separate legal
personality, the general impression is that they appear to possess
certain attributes that are consistent with the entity approach-"for
example, the ability to sue or be sued in its own name, the capacity to
own assets, the continuity of the partnership despite the departure or
death of [an LP], and the postponement of recourse against the
partners until a creditor has exhausted its remedies against
1
partnership assets." e

Comparing China and India, it would appear at the outset that
they represent diametrically opposing positions. While the limited
partnership in China possesses certain attributes that are consistent
with the entity approach, the trust in India does not have any.
However, as this Article argues, such an analysis would be superficial,
and it is essential to adopt a functional approach in examining the
trust. In doing so, it is clear that even though the trust may not have a
separate legal personality, it possesses entity-like features which
makes it functionally similar to the Chinese limited partnership with
a separate legal personality.
To begin with, a trust is an obligation, and the trustee has legal
ownership of the trust property. 117 Under Indian trust law, the

111. See id.
112. See Michael Killourhy, BVI Limited PartnershipsAct 2017, OGIER (Feb.2 12,
17
https://www.ogier.com/publications/bvi-limited-partnership-act- 0
2018),
[https:/perma.ec/CX66-85YL] (archived Jan. 31, 2020).
113. General Rules of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated
by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 57.
114. See id. at art. 58.
115. See id. at art. 102.
116. See Lin Lin & Hwee Ying Yeo, Limited Partnership-NewBusiness Vehicle in
People's Republic of China, 25 BUTTERWORTH's J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 104, 104
(2010).
117. See The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882), § 3 (defining a
trust as "an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and arising out of a
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beneficiaries have no interest, whether legal or equitable, in the trust

property. 1 18 As one commentary notes in the context of the use of the
term "beneficial interest" in the Indian Trusts Act:
It is clear that the term has been introduced and defined with a view to eliminate
any chance whatsoever of introducing the English concept of beneficiary having
an 'equitable estate' in the trust property, the subject matter of the trust. The
beneficiary has a mere 'beneficial interest,' a right against the trustee as owner
of the property, but no estate or interest in the subject matter of the trust.1 1 9

Indian trust law indicates a clear separation between the trust
property that the trustee holds and the interest of the beneficiary,
which is similar to that of property that a company holds in relation to

its shareholders.1 2 0
The trustee bears the obligation of protecting title to the trust
property121 and is expected to maintain the trust funds separate from
the trustee's own funds. 122 Professor John Langbein notes: "This
segregation regime separates the trustee's trust property from
nontrust property without having to lodge ownership of the trust
property in a distinct entity endowed with juridical personality, such
as a corporation."1 2 3 Thus, even though the trust is not a separate legal
personality, the segregation of assets introduces entity-like features. 12 4
Professors Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei argue that such a
segregation requirement ensures that trust assets are shielded from
claims of the trustee's personal creditors and that such a protection is
similar to that provided by a corporation.12 5
Moreover, trustees are not personally liable to the trust's creditors
unless they have provided a guarantee.12 6 The limited liability of the

confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner, or declared and accepted by him, for
the benefit of another, or of another and the owner"). The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of
1882, INDIA CODE (1882).
118.

See H.C. JOHARI, MUKHERJEE'S COMMENTARY ON INDIAN TRUSTS ACT, 1882,

94 (1999).
119. Id. (emphasis in original).
120. Corporate property is owned by the company, over which shareholders have
no proprietary rights (neither legal nor beneficial). See GOWER: PRINCIPLES OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW 35-36 (Paul Davies & Sarah Worthington eds., 10th ed. 2016).
121. See Indian Trusts Act,1882, §13.
122. See DHARAM PAL NIGAM, N. SURYANARAYANA IYER's THE INDIAN TRUSTS ACT,
1882, at 166 (1997).
123. Langbein, supra note 16, at 180.
124. See Morley, supra note 15, at 2154 (stating that "[t]o be clear, a common law
trust was never a distinct juridical personality. Under the common law, a trust has
always been a personal obligation of the trustee.") (alteration in original); Sitkoff, An
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, supra note 17, at 641.
125. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 438; see also Schwarcz, An
Invitation to Comparatists,supra note 18, at 325 (observing that "the trust relationship
provides for limited liability: beneficiaries of the trust may claim (absent breach of trust)
only against the trust assets, not against personal assets of the trustee; nor may the
trustee's personal creditors claim against the trust assets") (internal footnotes omitted).
126. See Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, supra note 17, at 641.
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beneficiaries would ensure that they are not personally liable for
liabilities incurred by the trust.1 27 Similarly, beneficiaries are residual
claimants in the trust property as they obtain the remainder of the
trust's assets after settling other claims, subject to the trust
instrument.1 2 8 These features effectively ensure that the trust itself,
although not a separate legal personality, is distinct from the trustee,
12 9
the beneficiaries, and the settlor.
13 0
that the trust is an entity
The idea propagated by some scholars
3 1
One
or that it has de facto legal personality has come under attack.'
critic argues that while trusts carry some characteristics of asset
13 2
partitioning, "they are porous when compared to the corporation."
While this theoretical debate continues, this Article does not take the
stance that the trust is a separate legal personality or an entity. It is
only concerned with the fact that the trust exhibits entity-like features
purely from a functional standpoint rather than in terms of precise
jurisprudential distinctions. Moreover, the aforesaid debate appears
largely in the context of a comparison between the trust and the
corporation, while this Article is concerned with the trust and the
limited partnership. If one were to place the trust along a spectrum
between a limited partnership with aggregate features (as found in the
United Kingdom and Singapore) and a limited partnership with entity
features (as found in the United States and China), the trust is likely
to be closer, but not identical, to the position in the United States and
China. To that extent, the entity features of the Indian trust make it a
more optimal business form for venture capital than the limited
partnership that carries the aggregate form, as is prevalent in some

jurisdictions.
This Part began with a discussion of the relevance of the entity
status for the business form in a venture capital fund. While China's
limited partnership law confers entity status on that form, the
situation is less clear with the Indian trust. However, a functional
analysis of the trust's features indicate that its characteristics share
further similarities with the Chinese limited partnership than it
appears to at first glance. After considering the entity features
(complete or partial) of the business forms for venture capital in China,
the next Part considers the management structure and liability issues
in these forms.

127. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 462. The aspect of limited liability
of the beneficiaries is discussed in greater detail later. See infra Part IV.
128. See Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, supra note 17, at 646-47.
129. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 470.
130. See generally Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16; Langbein, supra note 16;
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, supra note 17.
131. See, e.g., M.W. LAU, THE EcONOMIC STRUcTURE OF TRUSTS 61-79 (2011); see
also Tjio, supra note 88, at 5 (noting that the UK does not treat the trust as a separate

legal

entity).

132. LAU, supra note 131, at 79.
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IV. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND INVESTOR LIABILITY

The limited partnership has been a successful business form in
the venture capital industry because it provides for a unique
combination of GPs who are managers with unlimited liability and LPs
who cannot take part in the management and hence are conferred the
benefit of limited liability. 133 The management-liability correlation is
rather stark. In fact, as one commentator observes, "a limited
partnership is the only entity some of whose owners have a full liability

shield (limited partners) and some of whose owners have no liability
shield (general partners)" 134 and that "[n]o other business form
provides this dual-track liability construct" 13 5
Such a management-liability correlation arises on account of the
"control rule," which provides that LPs would become liable if they take
part in management of the limited partnership.13 6 This compels LPs to
take a passive stance. The control rule has inevitably invoked a
comparison between LPs and shareholders in a company. Despite the
separation between ownership and management in a company, 137
shareholders possess more intervention rights than LPs. 138 For
example, shareholders may intervene on key matters involving a
company that are allocated to shareholder decision-making. 139
Shareholders may elect or remove directors and thereby indirectly
influence the management of the company through their control over

the composition

of the board.

140

Shareholders

may also elect

themselves as directors.14 1 However, LPs cannot carry out such actions

in a limited partnership without potentially losing their limited
liability shield.142 To mitigate the harshness of this situation, several
jurisdictions have introduced safe harbor provisions in limited
partnership statutes whereby certain specified acts of shareholders
would not be considered acts of management, and hence would not

137.

See ADOLF A. BERIE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION

&

133. See Ribstein, Limited PartnershipsRevisited, supra note 2, at 974-75.
134. Carter G. Bishop, The New Limited Partner Liability Shield: Has the
Vanquished Control Rule Unwittingly Resurrected Lingering Limited PartnersEstoppel
Liability as Well as Full General PartnerLiability?, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 667, 667
(2004).
135. Id. at 674.
136. Lin, PrivateEquity Investor Protection:Conceptualizingthe Duties of General
Partnersin China, 15 BERKELEY BUs. L.J. 43, 52 (2018) [hereinafter Lin, Private Equity
Investor Protection];see also Christopher Morris, The Private Fund Limited Partnership:
The Reform Company Lawyers Have Been Waiting For?, 38 COMP. L. 192, 192-93 (2017).
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (1933).

138. See Larry E. Ribstein, PartnershipGovernanceof Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 289, 294 (2009).
139. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection supra note 136, at 52.
140. See id.
141. See Gulinello, Venture Capital Funds, Organizational Law, and Passive
Investors, supra note 37, at 320.
142. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection,supra note 136 at 52.
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attract liability. 143 The Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 2001144 in
the United States has gone even further by eliminating the control
rule.145
The control rule still exists in many jurisdictions, such as
Delaware, 146 New Zealand, 147 Singapore, 148 and the United
Kingdom.' 4 9 Chinese law does not clearly provide that a LP will lose
the limited liability protection if she participates in the control of the
firm under Article 68 of the PEL.1 50 Rather, the PEL merely provides
a list of activities not viewed as taking part in partnership
management (also known as the "safe-harbor activities" list) in order
to assist the LPs in demarcating the legitimate scope of their
1
participation in the fund's activities.' 5 Article 68 of the PEL provides
that:
[A] limited partner shall neither execute the partnership affairs, nor represent
the limited partnership outside. The following acts of a limited partner shall not
be deemed as executing the partnership affairs:
(1) participating in making a decision on the admission or withdraw of a
common partner; (2) bringing forward a proposal on the business management

of the enterprise; (3) participating in selecting an accounting firm to cope with
the audit business of the limited partnership enterprise; (4) obtaining a financial
report of the limited partnership enterprise upon audit; (5) consulting the
account books of the limited partnership enterprise and other financial materials
which concern the limited partner's own interests; (6) filing claims or lodging a
lawsuit against the liable partner(s) when this limited partner's interests in the
limited partnership enterprise are impaired; (7) When the partner responsible
for executing the partnership affairs fails to exercise his right, to urge them to
exercise their rights or initiate a lawsuit for protecting the interests of the
15 2
enterprise; and (8) offering a guarantee for this enterprise according to law.

This provision is arguably defective as it does not define what

&

143. See Deborah A. DeMott, Our Partners' Keepers? Agency Dimensions of
PartnershipRelationships, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 115 (1995); McCahery
Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 79.
144. See generally Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) (2001).
145. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) (2001) (last amended 2013): A
Summary,
Uniform
Law
Comm'n
2,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Docu
mentFileKey-ba658bd6-ac5-be85-fc99- 178fd09f21da&forceDialog-0 (last visited Mar.
28, 2020) [https://perma.c/6F3W-RDBZ} (archived Feb. 3, 2020).
146. See
DEL.
CODE
tit.
6,
§17-303
(2017),
https://law.justia com/codes/delaware/2017/title-6/chapter-17/subchapter-iii/section-17303/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K7DM-2V8U] (archived Feb. 1, 2020).
147. See Limited Partnerships Act 2008, § 30 (N.Z.).
148. See Limited Partnerships Act 2008, § 6 (Sing.).
149. See Limited Partnerships Act 1907, § 4(2) (U.K.).
150. See Lin, Private Equity Limited Partnershipsin China, supra note 67, at 201.
151. See id.
152. Partnership Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China, (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007), ch.
I, art. 68.
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constitutes "carrying out the partnership affairs" and it is unclear
whether this list of activities is exhaustive.153 There is reasonable
doubt as to whether this short list is sufficient to cover all situations in
different business environments. Such legal uncertainty has created
problems in judicial practice. 154 Even in the US state of Delaware,
where there is a lengthy safe harbor list, the courts have not yet been
able to provide a satisfactory interpretation of the extent of the control
rule and when LPs should be regarded as subject to unlimited
liability. 155 Moreover, the test for finding a LP liable for breaching the
15 6
control rule has been evolving and varies from country to country.
Moving to the trust structure, there is no explicit control rule in
such a business form. The beneficiaries of a trust are usually passive
(unless the trustee is one of the beneficiaries) and they enjoy the
advantage of limited liability. 15 7 One commentator has remarked that
historically the limited liability feature of a trust has not been as strong
as that in a company, but that it has always been much stronger than
in a general partnership.158 In such a scenario, beneficiaries in a trust
structure need not be concerned about unlimited liability, especially
because trust law knows of no explicit control rule. This is also a
significant reason why the trust has been a popular business form in

India.
Under the Indian Trusts Act,

1882, the explicit liability of

beneficiaries is confined to certain specific scenarios, such as where a
beneficiary (a) joins in a breach of trust, (b) knowingly obtains any
advantage from such breach without the consent of the other
beneficiaries, (c) fails to take action after becoming aware of a breach
of trust or a potential breach, or (d) deceives and induces the trustee to
commit a breach of trust. 1 59 In the absence of such a specific act or
omission on their part, beneficiaries will not carry any liability for loss
16 0
caused to the trust property.
The contracting provisions and market practice in India reinforce
the limited liability of the beneficiaries, being investors in a venture
capital fund. Parties are able to further limit the liability of the
beneficiaries contractually in the trust, which adds to the

153. Some commentators suggest that it is not an exhaustive list. See 1fJ-, "i
6 A [Liu Qingfei, Discussion
((C i j(T3tM 2007 ti
k J"#IiTTf'
J'S
on Limited Partner's Execution of Partnership Affairs, 6 POL. & L. (2007)]; id. at 101.
154. Many Chinese funds set up the investment committees for LPs to participate
in the management of the firm and this has led to internal conflicts between LPs and the
GP. See Lin, Private Equity Limited Partnerships in China, supra note 67, at 193-94.
155. See id. at 204.
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Robert D. M. Flannigan, Beneficiary Liability in Business Trusts, 6
EST. & TR. Q. 278, 279 (1984); Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 463; Tjio, Lending
to a Trust, supra note 88, at 9-10.
158. See Morley, supra note 15, at 2174.
159. See The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882), § 68.
160. See NIGAM, supra note 122, at 166.
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161
As a practitioner publication
attractiveness of that business form.
notes in the context of the Indian AIF trust structure:

Structurally, an investor's liability is limited to its commitment.

Typical

indemnity provisions may be agreed by investors to indemnify the trustee,

manager or other committee member (indemnitees) for claims against the
indemnitees due to activities of the AIF (with usual "bad act" carve-outs, such as
for reason of fraud, misconduct or gross negligence). However, this
indemnification is also limited to an investor's commitment. Irrespective of the
manner in which the AIF is set up or the indemnification obligations of the
investors, contractually the liability of the investors in their capacity as investors
are typically restricted to their commitment amount. While the liability of
investors is limited in all available structures, if investors participate in the
management of the AIF, the liability may extend beyond their contracted capital
commitment.

162

As the last sentence in the above quote cautions, beneficiaries
cannot always seek and utilize limited liability protection even in the
163
The gap in trust law
absence of an explicit control rule for a trust.
may likely be filled by other branches of the law, thereby extending the
liability of beneficiaries beyond their commitments in venture capital
trusts in India. The remainder of this Part briefly considers
circumstances where alternative forms of liability could arise to
beneficiaries. 164 First, excessive intervention by the beneficiaries in
the management of the trust could lead to the relationship between the
parties being characterized as a general partnership, which would
1 65
The
impose liabilities on the beneficiaries as if they were partners.
Indian Partnership Act, 1932, defines a "partnership" as "the relation
between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business
carried on by all or any of them acting for all." 166 Moreover,
partnership status is determined by the contract between the
parties, 167 taking into account all relevant facts. 168 Given that a
partnership is created by contract, the contribution agreement must be
structured in a manner that significant management rights are not
conferred upon beneficiaries so as to make them partners in a firm that

161. See Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note 30, at § 1.5.
162. Id.
163. Some argue that there is a rationale for a control test in the case of a trust
that is similar to such a test in a limited partnership. See P.W.L., Liability of
Shareholders in a Business Trust-The Control Test, 48 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1108-09 (1962);
Flannigan, supra note 157 , at 284.
164. The details of such liability forms are beyond the scope of this paper.
165. The authors thank Kelry Loi for highlighting this possibility. See also
Flannigan, supra note 157, at 286 ("The existence of control rights in the trust agreement
is said to effectively create a partnership relationship among the beneficiaries (with the
trustees as their agents) and thereafter liability follows for all beneficiaries.").
166. The Partnership Act, No. 9 of 1932, INDIA CODE (1932), § 4.
167. See id. at § 5.
168. See id. at § 6 (highlighting some safe harbor situations which will not lead to
the formation of a partnership).
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will, in addition to their status as beneficiaries, impose unlimited
liability on them as partners.
by a beneficiary in the
Second, excessive interference
management of the trust could lead to the creation of an agency
relationship whereby the substantial control exercised by the
beneficiary over the trustee would make the trustee an agent and the
beneficiary the principal. 16 9 Under Indian law, "[a]n 'agent' is a person
employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings
with third persons."1 70 In such a scenario, the beneficiary as principal
1
will be subject to liabilities undertaken by the trustee as the agent.' 7
The imposition of such liability would depend upon how courts
interpret the legal effect of the substantial control exercised by the

beneficiary over the trustee. 17 2
Third, commentators have argued that even in the absence of an
explicit control rule, investors could be subject to liability on the
ground of estoppel if the actions of the investors provide sufficient
indication to third parties that the investors will assume liabilities of
the trust, and the third parties thereby place reliance upon that fact
when contracting with the fund. 173 This issue first arose after the
elimination of the control rule by the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
of 2001 in the United States, where commentators have cautioned of
the possibility that LPs could nevertheless be liable through
estoppel. 1 While minimal, such a risk could potentially arise for
beneficiaries in a venture capital fund organized as a trust in India.
Investors in an Indian venture capital fund who are beneficiaries
in a trust vehicle enjoy greater assurance when it comes to limited
liability, as Indian trust law does not appear to carry the equivalent of
a control rule. This confers a significant advantage to the trust as a
business form over the limited partnership, in which the managementliability correlation is premised on the control rule. However, should
the beneficiaries exercise interference in management of the trust,
they would then run the risk of incurring liabilities under any of the

alternative areas of the law such as partnership, agency, or estoppel.
Nevertheless, this has yet to be tested in India and, as such, remains
an uncertain possibility.
As the discussion above shows, both the Chinese limited
partnership and Indian trust are functionally similar in that they
provide a division of management responsibilities and liabilities. While

169.
170.
171.

See Flannigan supra note 157, at 279-81.
The Indian Contract Act, INDIA CODE (1872), §182.
See id. at §226 (stating that, "Contracts entered into through an agent, and

obligations arising from acts done by an agent, may be enforced in the same manner,

and will have the same legal consequences, as if the contracts had been entered into and
the acts done by the principal in person.").

172.
173.
174.

For the US position, see Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 16, at 474.
See Bishop, supra note 134, at 667-68.
See id.
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the Chinese limited partnership does this by providing limited liability
to all LPs, subject to the control rule, the Indian trust does this through
the inherent shielding effect of the trust. The Indian trust also provides
a functional equivalent to the control rule through the presence of other
doctrines which allow the court to recharacterize the relationship
should the investor excessively intervene with the management or
operations of the fund. It must be recognized that the two forms, while
not directly similar, serve as functional equivalents.

V. ADDRESSING THE AGENCY PROBLEM IN A VENTURE CAPITAL

FUND

The structure of a venture capital fund in which an active
manager operates the fund for the benefit of passive investors raises a
significant agency problem.175 This is exacerbated by the information
asymmetry problems associated with venture capital funds, which
result in investors being less able to monitor managers. 1 7 6 In addition,
venture capital investments lack liquidity, precluding investors from
easily exiting their investments. 177 In view of the early-stage nature of
the investments that venture capital funds make, managers may be
under pressure to demonstrate their success to increase the
marketability of their future funds. 178
The venture capital fund structure could also lead to shirking and
17 9
They may fail to exert the
rent-seeking behavior among managers.
required effort to generate returns to the investors, such as when their
180
time and effort are divided among the many funds they manage.
Crucially, venture capital funds may suffer from conflicts of interest
that are distinct to the industry. 181 For example, fund managers may
82
coinvest with the fund by cherry picking lucrative investments;1 they

175. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310
(1976) (providing a detailed discussion on the concept of agency problems); see also
Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization. 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
176. See Sahlman, supra note 10, at 493; see also AIPAC REPORT -I, supra note
33, at 23. 24, 30.
177. See Gompers & Lerner, supra note 10, at 476-77 ("No liquid market for
partnership interests exists, and limited partners are frequently restricted from selling
their partnership interests."),
178. See Robert P. Bartlett III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False
Dichotomy of the Corporation,54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 72-73 (2006).
179. See generally Haitian Lu, Yi Tan & Hong Huang, Why Do Venture Capital
Firms Exist: An Institution-Based Rent-Seeking Perspective and Chinese Evidence, 30
AsIA PAC. J. MGMr. 921 (2013) (explaining the rent-seeking perspective of venture
capitalists).
180. See Klausner & Litvak, supranote 10, at 62; Gulinello, supra note 37, at 34142.
181. See Gulinello, supra note 37, at 341-42.
182. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 62.
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may seek to exit prematurely from funds to prove their track record,
thereby generating less than optimal returns for their investors; 183
they may raise new funds even before the tenure of an existing fund;1 8 4
or they may misappropriate or convert fund assets for personal

interests. 185
The presence of a corporate manager in the venture capital
industry aggravates the agency problem. It is customary in the venture
capital marketplace for the manager to be established as a company,
whether it is a GP in a limited partnership (as in China) or a trustee
in the case of a trust (as in India). 186 This effectively shields the
individuals behind the manager from personal liability. 187 Through
this hybrid structure, venture capital entrepreneurs enjoy the dual
advantages of exercising complete control over management and
simultaneously overcoming liability issues by interspersing the
company as a liability backstop. 188 Moreover, decision-making by the
corporate manager is carried out through its directors and officers who
generally owe their duties to the corporation (and sometimes to its
shareholders). 189 While an individual manager owes duties to the
investors (whether in the form of LPs or beneficiaries), directors and

officers of a corporate entity owe no such duties directly to the
investors. This creates a conflict between two sets of duties (i.e., one
that the corporate manager owes to the investors, and the other that
the corporate manager's directors and officers owe to the corporation
itself, thereby giving rise to a dual agency problem). 190
One solution could be to establish a mechanism whereby the
individual directors and officers of the corporate manager owe their
duties directly to the fund's investors, allowing these investors to

directly

enforce

them

against

such

individuals.

191 Another

supplementary solution would be to address the double agency problem
by clarifying that in the event of a conflict between the duties of the
directors and officers to the investors and to the corporate managers,
that they shall accord priority to the interests of the investors in the

183. See Joseph Bankman & Marcus Cole, The Venture Capital Investment Bust:
Did Agency Costs Play a Role? Was it Something Lawyers Helped Structure?, 77 CHLKENT L. REV. 211, 231 (2001); Klausner & Litvak, supra note 10, at 69-70.
184. See Klausner & Litvak, supranote 10, at 69.
185. See Larry E. Ribstein, FiduciaryDutiesand Limited PartnershipAgreements,
37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927, 936 (2004) [hereinafter Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties].
186. See Robert W. Hamilton, CorporateGeneralPartnersof Limited Partnerships,
1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 73, 74 (1997).
187. See id.
188. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection,supra note 136, at 63.
189. See Lin & Yeo, supra note 116, at 105-06.
190. See id.
191. See Hamilton, supra note 186, at 107. To see how this approach has already
been legislated in Singapore for one type of business form, see Business Trusts Act 2004,
c. 31A, §10(2)(a) (Sing.).
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fund. 192 However, such treatment has yet to find its way into the laws
in China and India. Despite the clear-cut market practice of using
corporate general partners and corporate trustees in China and India
respectively, the investors must contend with the liability shield
behind which individual directors and officers of corporate managers

operate.
The literature also abounds with assertions that the imposition of
onerous duties on venture capital managers is unnecessary. 193 Parties
in the venture capital industry rely on implicit contracts and
reputational incentives more than they do specific legal contracts or
enforceable duties. 194 The staged contribution structure permits
investors to walk away from unsuccessful ventures. 195 The cyclical
nature of the venture capital industry, wherein the reputation of
venture capitalists will draw investors to invest in newer funds that
such venture capitalists may form in the future, motivates venture
capital managers to act in the interests of investors. 196 As one
commentator noted, "the importance of reputation in the venture
capital industry, made possible by the cyclical nature of investment in
venture capital limited partnerships, provides sufficient safeguards to
197
ensure that managers act in the best interests of their investors."
While this may hold true, at least partially, in the more developed
markets for venture capital financing such as the United States, the
veracity of such a theory is likely to be much weaker in markets such
as China and India, where reputational sanctions may not pose much
8
of a deterrent against misconduct by managers. 19
In this context, the remainder of this Part will critically analyze
the law and practice in China and India in their ability to address the
agency problems arising from their respective business forms. It first
examines the duties of the managers to act in the interest of the
investors and then the powers available to such investors to enforce
their rights effectively against the managers.

192.

This too has received statutory recognition in Singapore, see Business Trusts

Act 2004, c. 31A, §11(1)(b) (Sing.).
193. See, e.g.. Kate Litvak, Governance Through Exit: Default Penalties and
Walkaway Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreements, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
771, 772 (2004); McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 82; Gregory G. Oehler, The
Wider Implications of Implicit Contracts in Venture Capital Partnerships, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 489, 490 (2005).
194. See McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 6, at 82; Gregory G. Oehler, The
Wider Implications of Implicit Contracts in Venture Capital Partnerships, 1 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 489, 490 (2005).
195. See David Rosenberg, The Two Cycles of Venture Capital, 28 J. CorP. L. 419,
420-21 (2003) (providing explanations for the absence of litigation in the venture capital
industry).

196. Id. at 421
197. Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 366.
198. For a detailed discussion of the reasons in the context of China, see Lin,
Private Equity Limited Partnerships in China, supra note 67, at 213-14.
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A. Duties of Managers toward Investors
Given China's status as a civil law jurisdiction, there is no concept
equivalent to equity and common law fiduciary duties under Chinese
law. 9 9 Although there are no duties of loyalty and care specified under
the PEL, the PEL outlines several provisions on the duties of partners,
which play analogous roles to the duties of loyalty and care in common

law:
The partners should not engage in activities which may harm the interests of the
partnership.
The general partners should not carry out any business competing with that of
the partnership solely or cooperatively.
The partners
partnership.

should not engage in any self-dealing

business with the

The partner should not abuse any benefit of the partnership by taking advantage
of his position or misappropriating any property of the partnership by other
illegal means. If he does so, he shall return the benefit or property to the
partnership. If his act results in any loss to the partnership or to other partners,
he shall be liable for compensation.

The partner owes a duty to account to the firm for any benefit derived by him
from any transaction competing with that of the partnership, or from any selfdealing business by him with the partnership. The partner shall bear
compensation liabilities if any loss is caused to the partnership or to other
partners.

The managing partner (zhixing shiwu hehuoren) should regularly report to the
other partners on the process of partnership activities as well as the business
2 00
and financial status of the partnership.

Although these limited duties fail "to clearly and adequately
20
stipulate the partners' statutory duties," 1

[a]rguably, the above rule stipulating non-competition (Article 32(1) and Article
99 [of the PEL]), the duty not to misappropriate company property (Article 96 of
the PEL), and the duty to not engage in self-dealing (Article 32(2) and Article 99
202
[of the PEL]) are similar to the duty of loyalty found in the [United States].

has

In addition, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
also issued the Interim Measures for the Supervision and

199. Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 43. For the
fiduciary principles in China, see Nicholas C. Howson, Fiduciary Principles in Chinese
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 603-22 (Evan J. Criddle et al, eds.,
2019).
200. Lin, PrivateEquity Investor Protection,supranote 136, at 75.
201. Id. at 47,
202. Id. at 76.
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Administration of Privately Raised Investment Funds 2014 (2014
CSRC Interim Measures)2 0 3 to supplement the PEL with a list of
scenarios which are similar to the duty of loyalty. 204 For example,
Article 23 of the 2014 CSRC Interim Measures stipulates nine
prohibitions for fund managers, including, inter alia: "not to treat the
assets of different funds under management in an unfair manner," "not
to take advantage of fund assets or their positions to seek benefits for,
or transfer benefits to, themselves or persons other than investors,"
"not to divulge undisclosed information obtained by virtue of their
positions, or make use of such information to engage in, or expressly
ask or imply others to engage in, related trading activities," "not to
engage in investment activities detrimental to fund assets and investor
interests," "not to neglect duties, or fail to perform duties as required,"
and "not to engage in insider trading, market manipulation or other
improper trading activities." 205 However, as "the CSRC Interim
Measures is an interim measure, the effectiveness of the measures is
undermined.1 2 0 6 Also, the CSRC Interim Measures are promulgated by
20 7
Such a
the CSRC, which is a department under the State Council.
departmental regulation is ranked lower than the legislation made by
the National People's Congress in the hierarchy of legal sources under
Chinese law. 2 08 The People's Courts have the discretion whether to
refer to the CSRC Interim Measures in relation to cases addressing
venture capital but cannot directly apply these measures in making

judgments 2 09
Trust law in India imposes an array of obligations on the trustee
in dealing with the trust property. The trust statute elaborates these
duties extensively. 210 These include fiduciary duties to act in the

203. The CSRC Interim Measures set forth the regulatory regime for private funds
under five key topics: (i) registration and filing; (ii) qualified investors; (iii) fundraising;
(iv) fund operation; and (v) special rules for venture capital funds. Simu Touzi Jijin
Jiandu Guanli Zhanxing Banfa [Interim Measures for Supervision and Administration
of Privately-Raised Investment Funds] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
Aug. 21, 2014, effective Aug. 21, 2014), Decree No. 105 of the China Sec. Reg. Comm'n,
art. 12 (China) [hereinafter CSRC Interim Measures], read with Simu Touzi Jijin Muji
Xingwei Guanli Banfa [Private Investment Fundraising Behavior Management
Approach] (promulgated by the China Fund Industry Ass'n, Apr. 15, 2016, effective July
15,
2016),
art.
28,
CHINA
SEC,
REGULATORY
COMM'N,
(China)
http:/www.csrc.gov.cn/tianjin/xxfw/seyw/201.606/t20160608-298472.htm
[hereinafter Private Investment Fundraising Behavior Management Approach]
[https /perma.cc/TCU3-CFSD] (archived Feb. 2, 2020).
204. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 85.
205. CSRC Interim Measures, supra note 203, at art. 23.
206. Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 78,
COMM'N.
REGULATORY
SEC,
CHINA
CSRC,
About
207. See
19,
2020)
Apr.
visited
(last
http://www.esrc.gov.cn/publcsrcen/about/
[https:I/perma.ec/TDC4-VEQW] (archived Feb. 2, 2020).
208. See Lin, PrivateEquity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 70.
209. Id. at 78.
210. See The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882), §§ 11-30.
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interest of the beneficiaries and to avoid conflicts of interest,2 1 1 as well
as the duty of care.2 12 The fiduciary nature of the trusteeship position
imposes onerous obligations on the trustee to act in the interest of the
investors.2 13
At one level, the obligations of a trustee can be said to be more
onerous than that of a director of a company or even a partner in a
partnership. Trust statutes generally tend to incorporate strict duties
on trustees as compared to corporate law. 214 The law governing
fiduciary duties tends to be prophylactic in nature 215 and "the

functional core of the fiduciary obligation is deterrence." 216 For
example, trustees may be held liable for a self-dealing transaction even
if it is shown to be fair, 217 and they cannot derive the benefit of a
business judgment rule available in several jurisdictions under
corporate law. 218 At least in terms of the law on the books, these duties
are considerably onerous on the trustees in the case of a venture capital
fund that is organized as a trust, thereby arguably giving more than
adequate cover to the investors.2 i 9
However, the law in the books seems to be somewhat at odds with
the market practice on the ground. As seen earlier, 220 the venture
capital industry in India is replete with fixed-fee-earning third party
trustees whose incentives may not necessarily be aligned with those of
the investors. These institutional trustees in turn delegate their
responsibilities to the investment manager under the investment
management agreement.2 2 i Justifications have been proffered for such
delegation on the ground that venture capital funds are specialized
vehicles comprising investors who need less protection for their

211. See, e.g., id. at § 13 ("Trustee to protect title to trust- property."); id. at § 14
("Trustee not to set up title adverse to beneficiary."); id. at § 17 ("Trustee to be
impartial.").
212. See, e.g., id. at § 15 (providing, "A trustee is bound to deal with the trustproperty as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such property if it
were his own.. ").
213. See GRAHAM MOFFAT ET AL., TRUSTs LAW: TEXTS AND MATERIALS 806 (5th ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
214. See A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus Corporations:An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Competing OrganizationalForms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 186 (2010); Sitkoff, Trust as
"Uncorporation",supra note 15, at 37.
215. See, e.g., Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty,
121 L.Q. REV. 452, 453, 468-69 (2005).
216. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of FiduciaryLaw, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1039, 1043 (2011).
217. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Capital Market
Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 573 (2003).
218. See Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, supra note 17, at 656-57;
Warburton, supra note 214, at 186.
219. However, limiting the flexibility to management through onerous fiduciary
duties can constrain efficient business decision-making. See Warburton, supra note 214,
at 184.
220. See supra notes 95-96.
221. See id.
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decisions and that, in any event, these vehicles hold passive
222
investments rather than carry out an active business.
Indian trust law permits delegation of the trustee's office or duties
22 3
The trust law, therefore, takes
only under certain circumstances.
cognizance of the reality that trustees cannot be expected to perform
the entire role themselves, especially when it involves specialized
fields, such as venture capital investments. This, in turn, complicates
the extent to which beneficiaries may have a cause of action for
breaches of duties. Given the extensive delegation permitted by the
venture capital documentation, in reality, the investors will have to
proceed against the investment manager under the contribution
agreement, although the trustee will likely nominally be included as a
defendant in a suit.2 2 4 In addition, it is also suggested that an agent of
the trustee, such as the investment manager, who has been delegated
powers is "in the position of a constructive trustee by reason of
acceptance of the delegation of the trust and therefore he is not
225
absolved from liability."
Finally, trust documentation in Indian venture capital firms tend
to contain waiver, exculpation, and indemnification clauses that inure
226
Trust law generally looks at such
to the benefit of the trustee,
clauses favorably, except when they cover extreme situations such as
27
Under Indian trust law, the trustee
bad faith involving the trustee.2
would be liable for breach of trust except when (a) the beneficiary has
by fraud induced the trustee to commit the breach, or (b) the
beneficiary has concurred in the breach, or (c) the beneficiary has
22 8
subsequently acquiesced in the breach with full knowledge of facts.
However, the question of whether, apart from these specific situations,
the trust documents can contractually limit the liabilities of the trustee
is less clear. In the absence of specific indications from the legislature
or the courts in India, it seems likely that waiver, exculpation and
indemnity provisions ought to be sustainable, except when they relate

222. In the context of limited partnerships, see Ribstein, FiduciaryDuties, supra
note 185, at 941-43.
223. See The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882), § 47 (stating
that delegation is permitted only when "(a) the instrument of trust so provides, or (b) the
delegation is in the regular course of business, or (c) the delegation is necessary, or (d)
the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation").
224. For further discussion, see infra Part V(B).
225. Koka Sivananda Sastry v. The Samasthanam Choultry, (1968) 2 Andh WR
260; see also NIGAM, supranote 122, at 293.
226. See Shreya Rao & Vakasha Sachdev, Can Trustees Contract Out of Fiduciary
Liabilities?, INDIACORPLAW (Mar. 25, 2017), https:I/indiacorplaw.in/2017/03/cantrustees-contract-out-of-fiduciary.html [https://perma.cc/6ZD6-F35J] (archived Feb. 2,
2020).
227. See Sitkoff, Trust as "Uncorporation",supra note 15, at 39. Commentators
argue this to be the state of Indian trust law as well. See Rao & Sachdev, supra note 226.
228. The Indian Trusts Act, No. 2 of 1882, INDIA CODE (1882), § 23.
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serious forms of breaches such as fraud, bad faith or gross

negligence.2 29
In all, the agency problems for Indian venture capital managers
are dealt with through a combination of trust law and contract law.
While the organizational features are dictated by trust law, the
position is complicated by the fact that third party trustees play only a
nominal role as they effectively pass on all their roles and duties to the
investment manager, who performs an active role. Although the duties
under trust law are substantially strong in the Indian context, the
bifurcation of managerial roles between the trustee and the investment
manager introduces a level of murkiness as far as the rights of the
investor are concerned. Moreover, given the relative novelty of venture
capital structures in India, these matters have yet to be tested before
the Indian courts.
As the above analysis shows, both in China and India, the relevant
statutes impose duties and liabilities on the persons managing the
venture capital fund to act in the interests of the investors. However,
in both cases, there are several practical considerations that cast some
doubt on the extent to which these duties will have the consequent

impact on manager conduct.
B. Enforcement of Duties
Regardless of the legal position concerning the duties owed by
fund managers to the investors, these are ineffective if the investors do
not have any means of enforcing these duties. Having examined the
extent of duties, this Article now turns toward how they may be

enforced.
In China, enforcement of partners' duties is problematic. Although

Article 68(7) of the PEL allows the LPs to bring a lawsuit in their own
names in the interest of the enterprise when the GP has "neglected the
exercise of his rights," LPs can rarely obtain the evidence required to
prove such negligence.2 30 As "LPs have no right to participate in the
actual management and operation of the partnership, it is difficult for
23 1
[them] to collect relevant evidence through legitimate channels."
232
Moreover, "[k]ey evidence is often retained by the GP."
Further, the

GP is often a management company with few assets. Even if the LPs
successfully obtain a favorable judgment or arbitral award, it is
unlikely that any significant assets will be available for execution of
233
such judgment or award.

229.
230.
quotation
231.
232.
233.

See Rao & Sachdev, supra note 226.
Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 80-81 (internal
marks omitted).
Id. at 81.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
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There are 22 cases in which LPs have successfully litigated
against a GP in China under Article 68 of the PEL as of December
2019.234 In 8 out of the 22 cases, LPs won the cases. The first successful

derivative action lawsuit occurred on March 29, 2017: Jiao Jian et al.
v. Anhui Ruizhi Real Estate Development Co. 235 In this case, the
Supreme Court of People's Republic of China ruled in favor of the
LPs.23 6 Not only had the GPs failed to initiate legal proceedings on
behalf of the partnership after two entrusted loans were due for
collection, they also ignored the LPs upon their repeated requests to
exercise the partnership's creditor rights, failed to respond to
23 7
subpoenas, and failed to appear before the Court of First Instance.
debt
Evidently, the GPs had de facto abandoned the partnership's

claims, leading to the Chinese apex court's holding that the GP had
2 38
"However, the law remains
"neglected the exercise of [its] right."
silent as to whether LPs have to exhaust other remedies before
bringing a derivative action." 2 3 9
Turning to India, there is no need for derivative actions in view of
the fact that the trust does not constitute a separate legal
personality. 240 Investors as beneficiaries are entitled to initiate legal
action against the trustee under the trust document and pursuant to
trust law. In addition, they may have contractual recourse against the
investment manager. However, given the well-known delays in the
Indian courts, venture capital players have indicated a preference for
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. 24i This augurs well, given
the need for confidentiality. But, in a setback to the industry, the
Supreme Court of India in 2016 ruled that disputes arising out of
2 42
Nevertheless, from a
trusts' deeds cannot be subject to arbitration.
practical standpoint, this has failed to constitute a significant concern

234. These cases were found in the judgement database maintained by the Chinese
courts. See WENSHU COURT, http://www.court.gov.cn/wenshu.html (last visited Apr. 19,
2020) [https://perma.cc/YQP3-B39F] (archived Feb. 24, 2020). These cases include such
as: Shixingronghe Inv. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Changan Int'l Trust Co. and Tianjin Dinghui PE,
2016 SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 19 (China); Wangyufeng v. Guangzhou Int'l Procurement
Co. (2015) Huitianfajinminchuzi No.5345 Guangzhou Tianhe District Court, Civil
Judgement. For the discussion of limited partners' derivative action, see generally Lin
Lin, The Limited Partner's Derivative Action: Problem and Prospects in the Private
Eqouity Market of China, 41 H.K. L.J. 201 (2011).
235. The High Court of Anhui Province made the judgement on February 26, 2016
00005 'I), and ruled in favor of the LPs. An
-TTJ7f
Wan Min Er Chu Zi No. 00005 (i
Hui Rui Zhi appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court upheld the High
M 756].
ic
Court of An Hui's judgement. (2006) Zuigaofaminzhong No, 756, [(2016)
236. Zuigaofaminzhong No. 756.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. See Lin, Private Equity Investor Protection, supra note 136, at 80-81.
240. See Berry, supra note 110, at 177.
241. See Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supra note 30, at § 6.2.
242. See generally Shri Vimal Kishor Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah, (2016) 8 SCR
116 (India).
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as the principal commercial terms are contained in the contribution
agreement, the breaches of which can still be subject to arbitration.2 4 3
In addition to civil remedies, investors are entitled to approach

SEBI for regulatory action. 244 SEBI's role is confined to ensuring
compliance with the AIF Regulations.245 This could arise when the
venture capital fund carries out its investment in breach of the AIF
Regulations. This is a case of public enforcement which is focused on
deterring the venture fund and their managers, and the extent to
which it will result in a remedial measure offered to the aggrieved
investors is unclear.
As yet, there is no evidence of significant enforcement of duties by
investors. There have been at least two cases of note. One relates to a
regulatory action by SEBI, which imposed a penalty on an errant AIF,
which lent loans to a company in breach of the AIF Regulations.24 6
Although the matter went on appeal, it was later settled. 2 47 In another
case, the investors of ICICI Venture Funds Management Company
initiated legal action in Mauritius, in which the trustee company was
also impleaded 248 which is stated to be pending resolution.2 49
While the investor protection regime appears to be more robust in
India, a factor which is likely to boost investor confidence, there are
concerns regarding the ability of Indian courts to effectively enforce
investor rights in a timely manner. This shows that investor protection
goes beyond the mere form in which the fund is established. Attention
also has to be paid to the surrounding legal and quasi-legal
mechanisms which give teeth to the protections provided by the legal
form.

243. See Rau, Ghosal & Sharma, supranote 30, at § 6.2.
244. See id. at § 6.3.
245. See id.
246. See generally ADJUDICATION ORDER IN RESPECT OF 1. SREI MULTIPLE ASSET
INVESTMENT TRUST 2. SREI ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGERS LIMITED IN THE
MATTER OF SREI MULTIPLE ASSET INVESTMENT TRUST, SEC. & EXCH. BD. OF INDIA
(2017).
https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/nov-2017/adjudication-order-in-

&

respect-of-i -srei-multiple-asset-investment-trust-2-srei-alternative-investmentmanagers-limited-in-the-matter-of-srei-multiple-asset-investment-trust 36736.html
[https://perma.cc/2HY3-8P4A] (archived Feb. 2, 2020).
247. See generally SETTLEMENT ORDER IN RESPECT OF SREI MULTIPLE ASSET
INVESTMENT TRUST AND SREI ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MANAGERS LIMITED, SEC.
EXCH.
BD.
OF
INDIA
(2018),
https://www.sebi.gov.in/enforcement/orders/jul2018/settlement-order-in-respect-of-srei-multiple-asset-investment-trust-and-sreialternative-managers-limited-_39703.html
[https://perma.ec/X77Q-2HXB]
(archived
Feb. 2, 2020).
248. See Sobia Khan & Kailash Babar, NRIs Move Mauritius Supreme Court
Against ICICI Venture; Accuse PE Firm of Misleading Th7em, ECON. TIMES (July 24,
2014),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/mf/mf-news/nris-move-mauritiussupreme-court-against-icici-venture-accuse-pe-firm-of-misleadingthem/articleshow/38942748.cms?from=mdr
[https://perma.cc/A987-9SMD] (archived
Feb. 2, 2020).
249. See ICICI Bank Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F) 22 (July 31, 2019).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article challenges the extent to which the presence of an
optimal business form (i.e., the limited partnership) is determinative
of whether a venture capital market is able to flourish. As this analysis
shows, the organizational form may play a lesser role than what the
existing literature suggests. While the limited partnership has been
gaining prominence in the venture capital industry and jurisdictions
such as China have wholeheartedly embraced such a business form, it
is not the sole optimal structure.
Conversely, as the Indian experience shows, it remains possible
for the venture capital market to develop even if it utilizes a business
form that is widely considered to be suboptimal. The crucial point here
is not the theoretical optimality of the business form available to
venture funds, but whether the form is able to meet the practical needs
of fund managers and investors in light of the prevailing legal and
institutional considerations in each jurisdiction. To that end, the
Indian private noncharitable trust has proven itself by the way in
which it replicates the tax benefits and the division of control and

liability provided by the limited partnership. While there are indeed
problems with the form, as this Article has analyzed, these are
eventually resolved by way of creative contracting or by resorting to
doctrines from other sources of law. When this occurs, the effect of path
dependence sets in as the market becomes conditioned to the manner
in which venture capital funds are organized. The lack of enthusiasm
of Indian market participants to the introduction of the limited
partnership suggests that even if it were introduced now, it may be
possible that the market will retain the trust as the main business form
in venture capital.
This is an important lesson for jurisdictions seeking to introduce
newer business forms to enliven their venture capital scene. In some
cases, it is better not to meddle with what is not broken. In the end,
the precise nature of the business form may matter less. Instead,
regulators looking to develop their venture capital market may wish to
find ways to increase the pool of available funds, encourage innovation
and entrepreneurship within the market, or introduce new measures
that facilitate the exit of venture capital. Furthermore, any regulatory
oversight must be accompanied by robust enforcement mechanisms.
Ultimately, fundraising is only one stage in the venture capital cycle.
In order to develop a robust venture capital market, improving the
regulatory environment for investments and exits, encouraging capital
supply, and boosting entrepreneur participation are also important.
Regulators would do well not to miss the forest for the trees.
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